This week I look at arguments from:
Ullman (1980). Against Direct Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 373–415.
against the idea of direct perception and their use in arguing the mind involves representation.
In this episode I consider the use of:
Nagel (1974). What is it Like to be a Bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435–450
in arguments for property dualism, the claim that the mind is non-physical properties of the body.
Descartes “Second Meditation: The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body.” Translated by John Cottingham (1996) in Meditations of First Philosophy with selections from the objections and replies. Published by Cambridge University Press.
The second meditation provides an argument for substance dualism. What is it? How does it work?
Should we believe textbooks when they make claims like ” where people have a strong national identity, they may be more likely to have negative attitudes toward groups they perceive as different to themselves.” I look at:
Falomir-Pichastor, & Frederic (2013). The dark side of heterogeneous ingroup identities: National identification, perceived threat, and prejudice against immigrants. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(1), 72–79.
to find out.